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WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
TORTS-PROPER PARTY IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AFTER
DEATH OF STATUTORY BENEFICIARY-Partyka v. Yazoo Dev.
Corp., 376 So. 2d 646 (Miss. 1979).
On April 21, 1978 while driving in their car, Mr. and Mrs. Eugene
F. Hall III were struck by a vehicle of the defendant corporation. Mrs.
Hall succumbed to her injuries approximately thirty minutes after the
death of her husband. The Halls had no children. The appellant, Mrs.
Partyka, is the mother of the deceased Mr. Hall and the executrix of
his will. She brought suit for his death and the defendants filed a plea
in bar. They alleged that because the deceased left a wife who sur-
vived him, the administratrix of the wife's estate and not the appellant
was the proper party to bring the suit under Mississippi's wrongful
death statute.'
Following a hearing, the trial court sustained the defendant's mo-
tion and the suit was dismissed. On appeal Mrs. Partyka alleged that
the deferred class of statutory beneficiaries, consisting of the father,
mother, brothers and sisters, should be entitled to the cause of action
and damages for the wrongful death of their blood relative when the
only member of the preferred class, consisting of the husband, wife
and children, is not living at the time of suit or of recovery.
2
ORIGINS AND APPLICATION OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
Following the English decision of Baker v. Bolton,' the common
law rule was established that torts ceased to carry liability with the
death of either party, acto personalis moritur cum persona.4 This situ-
ation was remedied in 1846 by the passage of Lord Campbell's Act'
which was actually entitled "an act for compensating the families of
persons killed by accidents."' The avowed purpose of Lord Campbell's
Act and the acts of the various states patterned after it' was to give a
'Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1979).
The statute reads in pertinent part:
Damages for the injury and death of a married man shall be equally distribut-
ed to his wife and children, and if he has no children all shall go to his wife; ...
if the deceased has no husband, nor wife, nor children, the damages shall be
distributed equally to the father, mother, brothers and sisters, or such of them as
the deceased may have living at his or her death.
Id.
'Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646 (Miss. 1979).
'170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
4M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, para. 107 (7th ed. 1901).
'Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
'Id. See also, 1 S. SPEISER, REcoVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:8 (2d ed. 1975).
'The original Lord Campbell's Act has been the paradigm for many American federal
and state death statutes as well as for statutes of political divisions in Australia, Canada
and other foreign nations. 2 S. SPEISEa, supra note 6, at § 15:3 n. 17.
Mississippi is among those states with wrongful death acts patterned after Lord Camp-
bell's Act. See Byars v. Austin, 218 So. 2d 11, 15 (Miss. 1969); 34 B.U. L. REV. 535, 536
n.8 (1954). For a discussion on classification of state wrongful death statutes, see 2 F.
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new statutory cause of action to the decedent's administrator8 for the
benefit of the surviving dependents of the person wrongfully or negli-
gently killed in order to compensate the dependents for the pecuniary
loss they suffered due to the death.' The original act provided that
such actions should be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent or
child,"° and many statutes still limit it to a similar group.
Section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code provides a preferred class of
beneficiaries and a deferred or secondary class of beneficiaries entitled
to recover in the event of the wrongful death of a relative. The hus-
band, wife, and children make up the preferred class and the secon-
dary class consists of the parents, brothers, and sisters of the deceased
or such as may be living at the time of his death."
Determining the result when a preferred statutory beneficiary dies
after the wrongfully killed relative has been a problem for those juris-
dictions like Mississippi which fail to provide for such an occurrence
by specific statutory provisions.1 2 There is a disagreement among the
jurisdictions as to whether the action survives" to the beneficiary's es-
tate, is revived to other beneficiaries or abates entirely."
HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 24.2 (1956); 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at
§§ 1:8-1:13; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 at 902-05 (4th ed.
1971).
'The wrongful death acts of Mississippi and other states for which Lord Campbell's
Act is the prototype are regarded as creating a new cause of action on behalf of the
designated beneficiaries, and not an action on behalf of the estate, even though in some
states the cause of action must be brought by the personal representative of the de-
ceased. See Thornton v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 287 So. 2d 262, 266 (Miss. 1973).
See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., supra note 7.
In Mississippi no distinction is made in the right to sue as between the personal repre-
sentative and the survivors. See Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n v. Denson, 214 Miss.
397, 414, 57 So. 2d 859, 864 (1952); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 169 Miss.
447, 466-67, 153 So. 376, 380 (1934); J. J. Newman Lumber Co. v. Scipp, 128 Miss. 322,
335-36, 91 So. 11, 11 (1922). Cf. Thornton v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 387 So. 2d
262, 266-67 (Miss. 1973) (damages recoverable by the named survivors to be separated
from those recoverable by the estate).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925, Comment a (1977). See also W. PROSSER,
supra note 7; 34 B.U. L. REV. 535, 536 (1954).
"Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
"MIsS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1979).
"rennessee and Wisconsin are among those states with express statutory provisions for
the death of a beneficiary. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-613 (1956) (survives to "next of kin of
such deceased beneficiary"). WISC. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (West 1966) (the relative next in
order is entitled to recover).
"Survival statutes preserve the cause of action a decedent had before death and are
used to allow the action in wrongful death that a beneficiary had to survive to his estate
after his death. The proper plaintiff in an action under survival statutes is the executor
or administrator of the decedent's estate. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-233 (1972).
See also W. PROSSER, supra note 7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 926, Comment a
(1977).
"See, e.g., Freie v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 283 Mo. 457, 459, 222 S.W. 824, 826
(1920). See also 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 8:19; Comment, Wrongful Death Damages
in North Carolina, 44 N.C. L. REV. 402, 425 (1966).
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It has been held in some jurisdictions that if a statutory beneficiary
dies before commencing suit the right abates at his death. Courts up-
holding this view say that the action vests in the survivor at the time of
the wrongful death, but cannot survive to his estate because it is per-
sonal to him and is not a property right." Danis v. New York Central
R.R.'6 is a leading case for this view. In the majority of jurisdictions,
however, where damages are measured by loss to the beneficiaries, the
action only abates if the deceased beneficiary was the last or sole sur-
viving relative qualified under the statute to recover.
17
Another view concerning survival of the action is that the right
vests in the beneficiary immediately upon the wrongful death, becom-
ing his property and surviving to his estate if he subsequently dies.'"
The right of action is considered a property right by the courts which
follow this reasoning, since the action is meant to compensate for pe-
cuniary loss to the relatives rather than for direct personal injury. 9
Some courts adhering to this view hold, however, that if the action
does survive it survives only to compensate for the loss from the time
of the decedent's death until the time of the survivor's death."
Other jurisdictions adhere to still another view on survival of the
action-that after the death of a preferred beneficiary, when there are
no other members of that class surviving, members of the more remote
class designated by the statute may bring the action or have it
brought." If the statute gives the right of action directly to the survi-
vors, the right is sometimes said to have transferred from them to the
secondary class. The supporting rationale for this view is that the right
survives the death of the beneficiary, but instead of recovery going to
his estate it inures to the benefit of the more remote class. It is said in
support of this theory that the action does not vest at the time of death
of the victim, but rather at the death of the beneficiary it vests in
other surviving beneficiaries to the exclusion of the beneficiary's es-
11 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 8:17 See, e.g., Carter v. Van Meter, 495 S.W.2d 583
(Tex. 1973).
"160 Ohio St. 474, 117 N.E.2d 39 (1954).
"See, e.g., Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 581, 586-87, 162 N.E. 170, 175, 177 (1928);
Freie v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 283 Mo. 457, 465-66, 222 S.W. 824, 826 (1920);
Danis v. New York Cent. R.R., 160 Ohio St. 474, 117 N.E.2d 39 (1954). See generally 40
MINN. L. REV. 94 (1955-56).
"See, e.g., Sharp's Adm'r v. Sharp's Adm'r, 284 S.W.2d 673 (Ky. 1955).
"See, e.g., Meekin v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 164 N.Y. 145, 58 N.E. 50 (1900).
"
0See, e.g., Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 343 (1937) (applying Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 which provides for an action for wrongful death in admiralty cases).
"See, e.g., Garrard v. Mahoning Valley Ry., 100 Ohio St. 212, 126 N.E. 53 (1919);
Miller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 256 Pa. 142, 148-49, 100 A. 654, 655-56 (1917); Rushton v.
Smith, 233 S.C. 292, 104 S.E.2d 376 (1958); Johns v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 199 Va.
63, 67-69, 97 S.E.2d 723, 724-25 (1957) (applying statutory provision which makes the
administrator for the benefit of the deceased's estate a third class of beneficiaries).
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tate.22 There appears to be a general rule that if one or more of a
number of beneficiaries in a particular class designated by a death act
dies before judgment, the surviving members of the same class are en-
titled to have the action continued on their behalf.23 Mississippi and a
few other states provide that if there are no beneficiaries surviving, the
right of action vests in the estate of the wrongful death deceased.
WRONGFUL DEATH DECISIONS IN MISSISSIPPI
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Partyka v. Yazoo Development
Corp.25 was faced with a question it had not been squarely faced with
before. The court had to decide whether the mother of the deceased,
being a member of the secondary classification of relatives entitled to
recover under section 11-7-13,2" had a right to bring a death action
when the only member of the preferred class of beneficiaries died
shortly after the wrongful death victim and prior to the filing of the
suit. A few court decisions had touched upon the problem. Southern
Pine Electric Power Ass'n v. Denson27 held that Mississippi's statute
vested the right of action in the survivors to be asserted by the per-
sonal representative for the benefit of all persons entitled to recover or
by the survivors themselves. The court also said the cause of action was
not abated by the death of the survivors. The case has been cited as
authority for the rule that the action may be continued for the benefit
of the beneficiaries of the next succeeding class if the preferred benefi-
ciaries die before a suit is commenced, 28 but this was not actually the
holding of the case nor was this conclusion reached in dictum. The
decision in Southern Pine was to allow suit by the administrator of the
wrongful death decedent rather than by the estate of his wife who was
killed in the same disaster. The court, however, based its decision on
two factors not present in Partyka. First, in Southern Pine there were
no surviving statutory beneficiaries of any class, unlike the situation in
Partyka. The victim's wife died in the same occurrence and he had
neither children nor any living relatives qualified to recover. Section
"See, e.g., Little v. Ireland, 30 F. Supp. 653, 655 (D. Idaho 1939); Cummins v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 693-97, 66 S.W.2d 920, 926-29 (1933); Walsh v. Bres-
sette, 51 R.I. 354, 356-57, 155 A. 1, 3 (1931); Arendt v. Kratz, 258 Wis. 437, 46 N.W.2d
219 (1951).
"See Jenkins v. Midland Valley R.R., 134 Ark. 1, 203 S.W. 1 (1918); Elberton v.
Thornton, 138 Ga. 776, 76 S.E. 62 (1912); Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334
Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933); Accord Holt v. Stollenwerck, 174 Ala. 213, 56 So. 912
(1911).
t MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1979); Smith, Wrongful Death Damages in
North Carolina, 44 N.C. L. REV. 402, 425 & n. 143 (1966).
'376 So. 2d 646 (Miss. 1979).
T MISS. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1979).
" 214 Miss. 397, 414, 57 So. 2d 859, 864 (1952).
"Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646 (Miss. 1979);
25A C.J.S. Death § 40 (1966).
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11-7-13 provides that if the deceased has no husband, wife, children,
father, mother, sister or brother, "then the damages shall go to the
legal representative, subject to debts and general distribution."" Sec-
ondly, the pleadings in Southern Pine did not allege the survivorship
of the wife. Although her survival for a short period beyond the death
of her husband was established by the proof in connection with reduc-
ing the amount of damages, it was not averred in the pleadings and,
according to the case, the pleadings must conform to the proof. Thus
survivorship was not in question and simultaneous deaths were
assumed.s
In 1973 the supreme court in Smith v. Garrett,"' was asked whether
recovery for Mrs. Smith's wrongful death should go to her heirs by
descent and distribution or be paid out according to her will. There
were no statutorily designated relatives living at the time of recovery.
Faced once again with no surviving beneficiaries, the court allowed
suit by the decendent's representative and determined the meaning of
the statutory provision concerning whether damages are to be subject
to debts and general distribution.32 The court found the intent of the
legislature was that when there were no surviving heirs as specifically
named and listed, the damages recovered in a wrongful death action
would become an asset of the decedent's estate to be used in the pay-
ment of just debts of the estate. Any residue was to be distributed ac-
cording to the last will and testament of the deceased or by descent
and distribution if there were no will."3 Smith contained language to
the effect that the legislature did not list cousins of the decedent
among those entitled to recover and thus they should not be allowed to
recover the benefits of the wrongful death action, especially since they
were also not named by the testatrix in her last will and testament.34
Scott v. Munn 5 involved a suit commenced by a husband for the
death of his wife. The husband died before judgment and the adminis-
trator of his estate was allowed to continue the action. The court had
to determine whether the action to recover for loss of the wife's society
and the comforts of that society could survive to the husband's estate.
The court decided that the action for medical bills and services of the
wife constituted a property right that would survive the death of the
husband-beneficiary and pass to his estate, but the claim for compan-
ionship and consortium died with him and could not be revived."6
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1979).
80214 Miss. at 415-16, 57 So. 2d at 865.
8287 So. 2d 258 (Miss. 1973).
""If the deceased have neither husband, nor wife, nor children, nor father, nor moth-
er, nor sister, nor brother, then the damages shall go to the legal representative, subject
to debts and general distribution." MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972).
u287 So. 2d at 261.
"ld. at 260.
-245 Miss. 120, 146 So. 2d 564 (1962).
"Id. at 129, 146 So. 2d at 568.
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A distinguishing factor in Scott was that the suit was actually com-
menced by the preferred beneficiary before his death. Many courts
might reach a different result if the suit had not already been institut-
ed by the beneficiary.37 The justification for allowing the right to sur-
vive in such a case is that the action vests upon the death of the in-
jured person and the class of beneficiaries cannot thereafter be en-
larged or limited. 8
ANALYSIS BY THE COURT
The majority in Partyka relied mainly on the case law of other ju-
risdictions in reaching its decision to allow the right to sue for wrong-
ful death to survive for the benefit of the deceased wife's estate.39 Stat-
ing that the Kentucky wrongful death statute"0 is similar to that of
Mississippi, the majority found Sharp's Adm'r v. Sharp's Adm'r"1 to be
on point. There, a woman with no children was survived by her hus-
band who died twenty-six days after her death. The Kentucky Su-
preme Court affirmed the award to the husband's estate even though
the recipients of the benefits were the children of the husband by a
prior marriage. 2 The decision in Sharp's Adm'r adopted language of
prior Kentucky cases holding that a beneficiary in being or "in esse"
when the victim meets his demise causes the right to attach, and hav-
ing attached, it descends at his death along with his other personal
property.4"
The Partyka court said that according to the Kentucky decisions,
the person or persons entitled to benefits under the death statute were
to be determined at the time of death of the person wrongfully
killed." The Kentucky statute provides, "If the deceased leaves a
widow or husband and no children or their descendants, then the
whole to the widow or husband."'" (Emphasis added.) According to
Sharp's Adm'r, a spouse could only leave a surviving widow or hus-
band at the time of death. 6
The Mississippi Supreme Court, utilizing the rationale of Sharp's
Adm'r, reasoned that even though recovery would be distributed to
persons other than those designated by the statute, the statutory bene-
'1 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at § 8:17.
"Id. See also id. at § 11:40.
n376 So. 2d at 649-50.
'
0KY. REV. STAT. § 411.130 (1970).
4284 S.W.2d 673 (Ky. 1955).
"Id.
"Id. at 674-75 (quoting Thomas Adm'r v. Maysville Gas Co., 112 Ky. 569, 575-76, 66
S.W. 398, 399 (1902)). See also Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Adm'r, 169 Ky. 38,
183 S.W. 237 (1916).
"376 So. 2d at 649-50.
"KY. REV. STAT. § 411.130(2)(a) (1970).
11284 S.W.2d at 675.
[Vol. 1:471
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ficiary who died before the recovery would be benefited, even if only
through payment to his creditors."' Partyka also cited with approval
White v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co.'s which held that the determin-
ing factor was not how long a survivor lived, but just the fact that he
did survive the decedent.' 9
Three justices dissented in Partyka urging that the legislature had
settled the issue when it selected certain beneficiaries by name and by
class to recover damages as a result of a wrongful death." The dissent-
ing judges said the statute prevents recovery by the children of dead
brothers and sisters by designating brothers and sisters as a secondary
class of recipients, thus a decedent's own nieces and nephews are ex-
cluded."1 Therefore, according to the dissent there certainly could be
no legislative intent to allow the remote next of kin of the deceased
wife, some of whom probably were never even known by the de-
ceased, to recover for his death in preference to his own near relatives.
The dissenting judges relied on Smith v. Garrett52 and its language
regarding legislative intent. Therein it was stated that the wrongful
death statute, creating a cause of action unknown to the common law,
must be strictly construed. 3 Smith concluded that it would have been
an easy matter for the legislature to have provided for the benefits to
accrue to persons other than those named in the event of the death of
a named beneficiary as it had done in providing that the damages
received would become an asset of the estate when there were no sur-
viving heirs among those listed."'
The dissent in Partyka stated that the wrongful death "statute is
inclusive in itself and sets out the newly created cause of action and
the manner in which it should be enforced."5 It is a special statute
passed in derogation of the common law, and is separate from survival.
It does not cause the deceased's right of action to survive or to be
revived, but enables designated members of his family to recover dam-
ages." Justice Bowling, speaking for the minority stated in conclusion
that "an interpretation of the wrongful death statute which gives sole
'"376 So. 2d at 649-50 (quoting Sharp's Adm'r v. Sharp's Adm'r, 284 S.W.2d at 675).
a125 Kan. 537, 265 P. 73 (1928).
"Id. at 538-39, 265 P. at 73-74.
6376 So. 2d at 652-53 (Bowling, J., dissenting).
1MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1979). The relevant portion of the Mississippi
wrongful death statute actually provides: "if the deceased has no husband, nor wife, nor
children, the damages shall be distributed equally to the father, mother, brothers and
sisters, or such of them as the deceased may have livng at his or her death." Id. (em-
phasis added).
"287 So. 2d 258 (Miss. 1973).
"Id. at 260. See also Logan v. Durham, 231 Miss. 232, 239, 95 So. 2d 227, 229 (1957);
McNeely v. City of Natchez, 148 Miss. 268, 114 So. 484 (1927).
"t287 So. 2d at 261-62.
"376 So. 2d at 651.
"Id. at 653 (quoting Thomas v. State, 117 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1941)).
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recovery to remote in-laws, rather than the father, mother, brother
and sister cannot be reconciled with justice and right.""
ANALYSIS
The problem presented in Partyka is one that has plagued legisla-
tors and litigators whenever it has arisen. Because an action for wrong-
ful death is a statutory creature, unknown to the common law, the
need for clarity and definitiveness is greater, yet the possibility of
achieving it more remote. In Partyka three justices vigorously dis-
sented and Justice Lee felt compelled to write a concurring opinion,"6
thus verifying that an array of opinion and theory exists in this field
and on this problem in particular.
Legislative intent
The purpose of wrongful death acts of the Lord Campbell type59 is
to create a cause of action for the wrongful death of a decedent and to
specify exactly who is to recover the damages.6 Recovery is designated
for the exclusive benefit of certain members of the victim's family, not
for members of a deceased beneficiary's family.61 The Mississippi Su-
preme Court held in Scott v. K-B Photo Service, Inc.,62 that the type
of damages recoverable include those that the decedent's heirs might
have suffered because of their personal relationship with him, such as
support and loss of companionship.63 It seems unrealistic to say that the
estate of the wife and her relatives suffers damages in the way of lost
support and companionship. It would appear that the legislative intent
was to limit the persons benefited to those statutorily delineated and to
compensate them for their loss of the decedent's companionship and
support. Payment to a beneficiary's creditors hardly qualifies as serv-
ing such a purpose. Since the legislature did not intend for the benefits
to go to the estate of the wrongfully deceased, it is highly unlikely that
it intended a recovery should go to the estate of a deceased survivor.
Other states' approaches
A majority of the Partyka court compares Mississippi's wrongful
death statute with that of Kentucky.6 4 However, the wording of the
'ld. at 653.
"Id. at 651.
"The statutes for which Lord Campbell's Act is the prototype are those cast in like
language or interpreted as creating a new cause of action for the surviving relatives. See
The Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
"Brief for Appellant at 4 Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646 (Miss. 1979).
"Smith v. Garrett, 287 So. 2d at 260-61.
"260 So. 2d 842 (Miss. 1972).
"Id. at 844.
"Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.130 (1970).
[Vol. 1:471
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Kentucky statute appears significantly different. The majority places
great emphasis on the meaning of the word leave, 5 as used in the
Kentucky statute and concludes that one can only leave a surviving
spouse at the time of his death. Therefore, the beneficiary is deter-
mined at the moment of the victim's death. The Mississippi statute
provides, in its equivalent portion that, "if the deceased has no hus-
band, nor wife, nor children, the damages shall be distributed equally
to the father, mother, brothers and sisters.6.6." (Emphasis added.) Use
of the word has could more easily mean that beneficiaries are to be
determined at the time of the suit or of recovery.
The Partyka court relied heavily on the rationale of a line of Ken-
tucky cases culminating in Sharp's Adm'r in holding that the right of
action vested in the beneficiaries at the moment of the wrongful
death.6 Other state courts, however, have strongly contended other-
wise."' These authorities have used different theories to conclude that
the beneficiaries are determined at the time of suit.
One case holds that if the surviving spouse died without exercising
his right, "there is no survival of the spouse's right or transfer of it to
his or her personal representative or heirs but a new right is estab-
lished in the relative of the injured person next in order . . , 69 Other
cases speak of the right not vesting in any particular class at the time
of the wrongful death, but vesting instead in the personal representa-
tive of the wrongfully deceased on behalf of the class that is in exis-
tence when the right is enforced by suit."0 Thus, no right is vested in
any one person which can survive to his estate. In Morris v. Spartan-
burg Ry., Gas & Electric Co.7" the South Carolina court stated that
other beneficiaries were contemplated by the statute to recover in the
event of the death of a beneficiary of the first class.
The separate survival concept
Survival statutes are sometimes invoked to allow a right to sue in
wrongful death to survive to the estate of a deceased beneficiary. Sur-
vival is a totally separate concept, however.72 Survival of actions serves
certain interests and wrongful death certain others. A wrongful death
statute is all-inclusive, providing for recovery by other relatives if the
"376 So. 2d at 649 (construing KY. REV. STAT. § 411.130(d) (1970)).
"MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1979).
"376 So. 2d at 649-50.
"See generally Kwiatkowski v. Shelihorn & Hill, Inc., 57 Del. 458, 201 A.2d 455
(1964); Garrard v. Mahoning Valley Ry., 100 Ohio 212, 126 N.E. 53 (1919).
"Arendt v. Kratz, 258 Wis. 437, 441, 46 N.W.2d 219, 221 (1951).
"See generally Garrard v. Mahoning Valley Ry., 100 Ohio 212, 126 N.E. 53 (1919).
7-70 S.C. 279, 49 S.E. 854 (1904).
"
tSee Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful
Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TUL. L. REV. 386, 386-87 (1942), Schumacher,
Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MICH. L. REV. 114 (1924).
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first class is not in existence and providing for recovery by the victim's
estate if none of the listed relatives are in existence. Survival concepts
should not be imposed upon a wrongful death action to effect results
unintended and clearly excluded by legislators. To allow a wrongful
death action to survive to the estate of a beneficiary who died seems
clearly contrary to the purpose of wrongful death actions-compen-
sating the designated relatives for their loss caused by the death.
73
Nowhere within section 11-7-13 is the personal representative of a
deceased beneficiary listed as being empowered to bring the death ac-
tion.74 Only those named in the statute are so entitled. The imposition
of survival would have the effect of enlarging the class of those enti-
tled to institute the action and to recover.
Unjust results
If a beneficiary's estate is allowed to recover, outsiders unrelated to
the decedent, who suffered no pecuniary loss or loss of companionship
would be eligible to benefit from the wrongful death action. The bene-
ficiary's relatives no matter how distant, who may or may not have
been known to the wrongful death victim, are allowed to recover in
preference to the decedent's own blood relatives. It hardly seems just
in Partyka that the decedent's in-laws will be able to reap the benefits
of the recovery when the deceased left living a mother and father,
sisters and a brother. Ironically, if an action for the wife's death is
brought subsequently, these same relatives who benefited through her
estate may be able to recover again. Such results do not seem consis-
tent with the purpose of creating wrongful death causes of action, nor,
as the Partyka dissent pointed out, consistent with justice and right.75
CONCLUSION
Wrongful death and survival of tort actions are areas wrought with
confusion and inconsistencies, in part because of a confusion of the
"Wrongful Death-Abatement of Causes of Action Upon Death of Sole Beneficiary,
40 MINN. L. REV. 94, 94-95 (1955).
"
4The action for such damages may be brought in the name of the personal repre-
sentative of the [wrongful death decedent) for the benefit of all persons entitled
under the law to recover, or by widow for the death of her husband, or by the
husband for the death of the wife, or by the parent for the death of a child, or in
the name of a child, or in the name of a child for the death of a parent, or by a
brother for the death of a sister, or by a sister for the death of a brother, or by a
sister for the death of a sister, or a brother for the death of a brother, or all parties
interested may join in the suit, and there shall be but (1) suit for the same death
which shall ensue for the benefit of all parties concerned ....
MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1979).
"376 So. 2d at 653 (Bowling, J., dissenting).
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underlying principles and the failure to distinguish between the rights
thus given. Undoubtedly adding to the misconceptions is the inclusion
by most wrongful death acts of provisions allowing for recovery of
damages that would be recoverable in a survival action. Partyka pre-
sented the court with an opportunity to clarify some of the misunder-
standings and to rectify some of the problems regarding death actions
and the mistaken mingling of wrongful death and survival. The court
instead has only added to the muddle.
Carmen Gettis Castilla

